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UNITED STATES V. BUCKLAND 
277 F.3D 1173 (9TH CIR. 2002) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Buckland,l the defendant appealed his 
drug conviction, arguing that the penalty provisions of the 
federal drug statute under which he was convicted and 
sentenced was facially unconstitutional.2 In light of the United 
States Supreme Court's ruling in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 3 the 
primary issue was whether Calvin Wayne Buckland's sentence 
could be enhanced without the enhancement factor, in this case 
the quantity of the drugs he was responsible for, being 
determined by a jury.4 Mter rehearing the case en bane, the 
court concluded that the statute was not unconstitutional on its 
face. 5 However, the court concluded that the district court 
1 277 F. 3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2002). 
2 [d. at 1177. The statute Buckland was convicted and sentenced under was 21 
U.S.C. § 841, which provides in relevant part: (a) Unlawful acts: Except as authorized 
by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally-- (1) 
to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, 
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; or (2) to create, distribute, or dispense, 
or possess with intent to distribute or dispense, a counterfeit substance. (b) Penalties: 
Except as otherwise provided in section 859, 860, or 861 of this title, any person who 
violates subsection (a) of this section shall be sentenced as follows[ 1 (The remainder of 
subsection (b) states, in detail, the potential maximum penalties imposed based upon 
the amount and type of drugs for which a person is found to be responsible). See 21 
U.S.C. § 841 (b)(I)(AH1)(B) (1994). 
3 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
4 [d. at 468. 
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erred in failing to submit to the jury a determination as to the 
quantity of drugs in Buckland's possession.6 The court, though, 
ruled that this error did not affect Buckland's substantial 
rights and affirmed his sentence. 7 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 1994, Buckland was indicted on one count of conspiracy 
to distribute methamphetamine, three counts of possession of 
methamphetamine with intent to distribute and three counts of 
using a firearm during a drug trafficking crime.8 The 
government alleged the involvement in the conspiracy of "one 
thousand (1000) grams or more of a mixture or substance 
containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine," which, 
if properly proved, carries a possible life sentence.9 However 
the jury was not instructed that it had to determine any 
particular amount of methamphetamine in Buckland's 
possession in order to convict him.lO The jury convicted 
Buckland on all seven counts.!1 The district court judge then 
determined, using the preponderance of the evidence test, that 
Buckland was responsible for eight kilograms of 
methamphetamine. 12 Buckland was sentenced to 824 months 
in prison.13 
On Buckland's initial appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the conspiracy and drug convictions, but vacated the firearm 
conviction,14 and remanded the case for resentencing.15 On 
remand, Buckland attempted to argue that the court relied on 
an inaccurate estimate of the quantity of drugs to establish his 
base offense level under the sentencing guidelines.16 However, 
the district court. initially limited its consideration to the 
6 [d. at 1183 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-68 (1997». 
7 Buckland, 277 F.3d at 1178. U.S. 461, 466-68 (1997». 





13 Buckland, 277 F.3d at 1177. 
14 [d. The firearm conviction was vacated under Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 
137 (1995). United States v. Buckland, No. 95·30147, 1996 WL 632958, at *3 (9th Cir. 
Oct. 28, 1996). 
16 United States v. Buckland, No. 95·30147, 1996 WL 632958 (9th Cir. Oct. 28, 
1996). 
16 Buckland, 277 F.3d at 1177. 
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fIrearm enhancement issue, so Buckland again appealed.17 The 
Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in failing to 
consider all of Buckland's sentencing objections and vacated his 
sentence and remanded for resentencing.18 This time on 
remand the district court considered all of Buckland's claims 
and reduced his sentence to 324 months. 19 
In a decision which was subsequently withdrawn, a three 
judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed' Buckland's 
sentence.20 The Court held that the United States Supreme 
Court's holding in Apprendi rendered the statute 
unconstitutional.21 The Ninth Circuit then heard the case en 
banc.22 
III. NINTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS 
A. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 21 U.S.C. § 841 
Buckland argued that the United State's Supreme Court's 
holding in Apprendi rendered the federal statute under which 
he was convicted and sentenced facially unconstitutional,23 
therefore his sentence was invalid.24 Buckland contended that 
through 21 U.S.C. § 841, Congress intended that the quantity 
of drugs attributed to a defendant be determined by a judge 
and not a jury, thereby subjecting it to the judicial 
"preponderance of the evidence" test instead of the ''beyond a 
reasonable doubt" standard used by the jury.25 
In Apprendi, the Supreme Court struck down a hate crimes 
statute because the statute expressly permitted a trial judge to 
increase a sentence beyond the statutory maximum if the judge 
found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the crime was 
17 United States v. Buckland, Nos. 97·30204, 97-35687, 1998 WL 514852 (9th Cir. 
Aug. 14, 1998). 
18 Buckland, 277 F.3d at 1177. 
19 [d. 
20 United States v. Buckland, 259 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2001). 
21 [d. 
22 265 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2001). 
23 Buckland, 277 F.3d at 1178. 
24 [d. Buckland also claimed that: (1) he was entitled to points for acceptance of 
responsibility; (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) that the 
evidence was insufficient to establish the type of methamphetamine. [d. The court 
dismissed these as having "no merit." [d. 
25 [d. at 1179. 
3
Feinberg: Criminal Procedure
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2002
86 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1 
motivated by bigotry.26 The Supreme Court held that n[o]ther 
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the 
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum 
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.n27 
In comparing Section 841 to the statute struck down in 
Apprendi, the Ninth Circuit found Section 841 "most striking 
for what it did not say. The statute does not specify who shall 
determine drug quantity or identify the appropriate burden of 
proof for these determinations."28 Since the statute did not 
contain any clause expressly, and unconstitutionally, granting 
additional power to the judge, the court determined that 
Buckland had in effect asked the court to "add a distinctive 
feature to this statute that not only does not appear in it, but, 
as far as we can tell, also was never debated or discussed in 
Congress."29 In cases like Buckland's, it was the courts, not the 
statute, which assigned judges the responsibility for 
determining sentence enhancements. 30 
The court found this to be the key distinction between 
Buckland's case and Apprendi.31 In Apprendi, the statute at 
issue explicitly provided for a hate crime sentencing 
enhancement to be imposed based on a finding of the trial court 
by a preponderance of the evidence.32 Unlike the statute in 
Apprendi, Section 841 was silent as to whether the court or the 
jury was to determine the quantity of drugs for which a 
defendant was responsible.33 Since Section 841 differed in this 
material way, the court held that the rule in Apprendi "in no 
way conflicts" with the explicit terms of the statute at issue in 
Buckland.34 
The court was also critical of Buckland's attempt to draw a 
distinction between "elements" of the crime that the jury is 
26 Apprendi, 530 u.s. at 490. 
27 Id. 
28 Buckland, 277 F.3d at 1179. 
29 Id. at 1181. Buckland failed to identify "any persuasive legislative history" that 
shows Congress clearly intended "the procedure" he was attackmg as unconstitutional. 
Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 1179. 
32 Id. 
33 Buckland, 277 F.3d at 1179. 
34 Id. at 1180 (quoting United States v. Cernobyl, 255 F.3d 1215, 1219 (10th Cir. 
2001». 
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charged to determine and "penalties" or "sentencing factors" 
that are determined by judges.35 The court called this 
"semantical hair splitting"36 and found that such "conceptual 
pigeon-holing" interfered with the language of the statute.37 
The court found this distinction misguided because ""the 
relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect--does the 
required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment 
than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict?"38 The court 
concluded that Apprendi compels it to submit to the jury 
questions of fact that may increase a defendant's exposure to 
penalties, regardless of whether that fact is labeled an element 
or a sentencing factor.39 
The court also acknowledged a tension between its 
decisions in Buckland and United States v. Nordby.40 In 
Nordby, the court used the "sentencing factor" label as a basis 
for concluding that Congress committed "quantity" to the 
sentencing judge for a finding by a preponderance of the 
evidence.41 To the extent that the cases conflict, the Ninth 
Circuit held that its decision in Buckland expressly overruled 
Nordby.42 Accordingly, the court concluded that it was "fairly 
possible" to give 21 U.S.C. § 841 and its various provisions a 
constitutional construction under Apprendi.43 
B. PLAIN ERROR 
Buckland did not object to the district court's use of the 
"preponderance of the evidence" standard in determining the 
amount of methamphetamine he was charged with. 44 As a 
result, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's actions 
35 Id. at 1180·81. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 1180. 
36 Id. (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494). 
39 Buckland, 277 F.3d at 1181. 
40 225 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2000); Buckland, 277 F.3d at 1182. In Nordby, the jury 
determined that the defendant had only harvested a "measurable" amount of 
marijuana, which triggered a maximum sentence of five years. Id. at 1182. However, 
the judge at sentencing determined by a preponderance of the evidence that Nordby 
was responsible for more than 1000 plants and sentenced him to 10 years to life. Id. at 
1182. 
41 Buckland, 277 F.3d at 1182. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 1187. 
44 Id. at 1183. 
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only for "plain error."45 Under the plain error standard, 
Buckland was required to establish the existence of an error, 
that was plain, and that affected his substantial rights.46 In 
addition, the court stated that the error would only be 
corrected if it "'seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings. "'47 
On appeal, the government "forthrightly" acknowledged 
that it erred in failing to submit the question of drug quantity 
to the jury for a finding beyond a reasonable doubt.48 The 
government also conceded that the district court erred by 
imposing a unitary sentence in excess of the 20-year maximum 
penalty for any unspecified amount of methamphetamine.49 
Nonetheless, the government argued that the sentencing errors 
were not prejudicial. 50 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the trial judge's 
determination of drug quantity which increased Buckland's 
sentence beyond the statutory maximum was indeed "clear" 
and "obvious" error.51 Nevertheless, the court held that the 
trial judge's determination did not prejudice Buckland in a 
manner that "affected the outcome of the proceeding."52 The 
primary justification was that the trial judge made the 
quantity determination only after looking to information with 
oth~r indicia of reliability. 53 ''Whether the court looked at the 
unchallenged amount taken from Buckland by police" or at the 
amount "conceded" by Buckland's attorney, the amount of 
drugs was sufficient to trigger the sentence.54 As a result, the 
Apprendi error did not affect the outcome of the proceedings 
and accordingly did not affect Buckland's substantial rights.55 
45 Id. at 1188. 
46 Id. at 1178 (citing Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467). 
47 Buckland, 277 F.3d at 1178 (citing Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467 and quoting United 
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993». 
48 Buckland, 277 F.3d at 1178. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467·68). 
52 Buckland, 277 F.3d at 1183 (quoting United States v. Olano, 62 F.3d 1180, 1188 
(9th Cir. 1995) and Olano, 507 U.S. at 734). 
53 Buckland, 277 F.3d at 1184. 
54 Id. Buckland had failed to object to the amounts of methamphetamine set forth 
in the pre-sentence report and rejected the trial court's offer to hold an evidentiary 
hearing at the beginning of his three sentencing hearings. Id. at 1183-84. 
55 Id. at 1184. 
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The court also noted that Buckland's sentence could also 
have been upheld under the stacking provision of the United 
States Sentencing Guideline § 5G 1.2, 56 under which the trial 
judge would have been required to sentence him to 324 
months.57 The court therefore determined that the Apprendi 
error was "immaterial."58 
c. FAIRNESS, INTEGRITY AND PUBLIC REPUDIATION 
Lastly, the court concluded that even if it were to assume 
that the error did affect Buckland's substantial rights, the 
court would still affIrm his conviction because the error did not 
"seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings. "59 In making this determination, the 
court relied on the reasoning set forth in United States v. 
Keys. 60 In Keys, the court concluded that the "failure of the 
district court to submit an element of the offense to the jury 
was inconsequential because (1) the evidence proving that 
element was overwhelming, and (2) the defendant did not 
contest it as part of his defense."61 
56 [d. United States Sentencing Guideline § 5G 1.2, Sentencing on Multiple Counts 
of Conviction, provides: 
(a) The sentence to be imposed on a count for which the statute (1) specifies a 
term of imprisonment to be imposed; and (2) requires that such term of 
imprisonment be imposed to run consecutively to any other term of 
imprisonment shall be determined by that statute and imposed independently. 
(b) Except as otherwise required by law (see § 5G1.1(a), (b», the sentence 
imposed on each other count shall be the total punishment as determined in 
accordance with Part D of Chapter Three, and Part C of this Chapter. 
(c) If the sentence imposed on the count carrying the highest statutory maximum 
is adequate to achieve the total punishment, then the sentences on all counts 
shall run concurrently, except to the extent otherwise required by law. 
(d) If the sentence imposed on the count carrying the highest statutory maximum 
is less than the total punishment, then the sentence imposed on one or more of 
the other counts shall run consecutively, but only to the extent necessary to 
produce a combined sentence equal to the total punishment. In all other respects 
sentences on all counts shall run concurrently, except to the extent otherwise 
required by law. 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.2 (2001). 
57 Buckland, 277 F.3d at 1186. 
58 [d. 
59 [d. (citing Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469-70). 
60 133 F.3d 1282 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), as amended by 143 F.3d 479 (9th Cir. 
1998) and 153 F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 1998), and cert. denied, 525 U.S. 891; Buckland, 277 
F.3d at 1186. 
61 Buckland, 277 F.3d at 1186 (citing Keys, 133 F.3d 1282). 
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In Buckland's case, his counsel failed to argue "any 
quantity issue" (emphasis in original) until the third 
sentencing hearing and the evidence "fairly indicates" that 
Buckland was directly responsible for over nine kilograms of 
methamphetamine.62 In fact, the Ninth Circuit found the trial 
court's determination about the quantity of drugs to be 
"conservatively discounted" and all discrepancies were resolved 
in Buckland's favor. 63 In this respect, the district court's 
calculations, "although based on the preponderance standard, 
appear fully supported by the record and accurate."64 
D. CONCURRING OPINION 
Judge Hug concurred in the judgment and with "much" of 
the majority, but dissented with regard to one of the majority's 
alternative bases for sentencing.65 Hug articulated that the 
"key inquiries" should be, "(a) whether the aggravated offense 
was charged in the indictment, and (b) whether the jury did 
find or reasonably could have found beyond a reasonable doubt 
the quantity required for the offense."66 In essence, Judge Hug 
stated that the defendant should only be sentenced for the 
offense for which he was indicted and of which the jury found 
him guilty.67 "[F]ailure to do so cannot be overcome under the 
plain error doctrine."68 
Judge Hug dissented from the majority's conclusion that 
Buckland's sentence could be affirmed in the alternative under 
the stacking provision.69 He characterized the majority's 
conclusion as stating that "even if Buckland was not indicted 
for a conspiracy to violate § 841(b)(1)(A) with a quantity of 
more than 1,000 grams, his sentence of 324 months could still 
be upheld by stacking consecutive sentences on the possession 
counts pursuant to § 5 G 1.2(d) of the sentencing guidelines."7o 
62 Buckland, 277 F.3d at 1187. 
63 [d. at 1187. 
64 [d. 
65 [d. at 1198. 
66 [d. at 1188. 
67 [d. at 1188. 
68 Buckland, 277 F.3d at 1194. 
69 [d. at 1190. Judges Rheinhardt and Nelson joined in this part of Judge Hug's 
opinion. [d. at 1187. 
70 [d. at 1196. 
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Judge Hug argued that if Buckland were sentenced to the 
statutory maximum for each of his Section 841(a) drug 
offenses, the total punishment would not exceed the statutory 
maximum.71 As a result, Section 5G1.2(d) actually would not 
be triggered and there would be no basis for "stacking."72 
E. DISSENTING OPINION 
The dissent joined Hug in challenging the alternative basis 
for sentencing Buckland, but also criticized the majority for 
failing to follow ''basic principals" of statutory construction. 73 
The dissent found that Congress' intent to have drug quantity 
decided by the judge at sentencing was "clear in both the 
statute and legislative history."74 The dissent also accused the 
majority of construing any perceived "silence" in the statute "as 
a license for the court to legislate its own solution."75 
The dissent concluded that determining the precise scope 
of the drug sentencing scheme was the prerogative of 
Congress.76 "It is not the courts' function to jerry-build a 
sentencing scheme that Congress might or might not have 
intended, had it foreseen the collision between Apprendi and 
Section 841(b)(1)(A) & (B)."77 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION 
The decision in Buckland brought the Ninth Circuit into 
conformity with its sister circuits,78 As noted by the Ninth 
Circuit in conclusion, "Our decision that the statute is not 
facially unconstitutional, of course, results in felicitous 
unanimity among the United States Circuit Courts of 
71 [d. at 1197 nA. 
72 [d. 
73 Buckland, 277 F.3d at 1198. Judge Tashima authored the dissenting opinion, 
joined by Judges Rheinhardt and Paez. [d. Judge Tashima stated, "My position that 
21 U.S.C. § 841 is facially unconstitutional is fully set forth in the panel opinion." See 
United States v. Buckland, 259 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2001), reh'g en banc granted, 265 
F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2001)." [d. 
74 Buckland, 277 F.3d at 1201. 
76 [d. at 1200. 
76 [d. at 1202. 
77 [d. at 1202. 
78 [d. at 1176. 
9
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Appeal."79 Although the statute remains valid, the dissent 
warned that such "felicitous unanimity" was not desirable for 
its "own sake."80 In his dissent, Judge Tashima argued that 
differences between the Circuit Courts of Appeal are useful in 
ventilating important legal questions and creating a 
background against which the Supreme Court can ultimately 
resolve "an issue for the country as a whole." 81 
Buckland makes clear that since the Nordby distinction 
between sentencing factors and elements of the crime is no 
longer valid, prosecutors will now be forced to ask juries to 
determine the relevant drug quantities. 82 Judicial economy 
will likely not be compromised since the same evidence 
advanced at trial will still be provided to the jury. However, it 
introduces the possible quirk that a jury could convict on drug 
possession, yet hang on the determination of quantity and, 
therefore, leave the sentence in flux. At the same time, the 
Buckland decision narrows the application of Apprendi by 
allowing the federal drug statute to stand because of - not in 
spite of - its ambiguity.83 
In the concurrence, Judge Hug also suggested that there 
persists some additional ambiguity as to whether Apprendi 
applies only when the sentence would go beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum.84 Judge Hug inquired, "[h]ow would one 
know at the time of trial whether, if the defendant is convicted, 
the judge's ultimate sentence would exceed the statutory 
maximum?"85 Judge Hug proposed that the same standard 
should be applied prospectively and retrospectively, and the 
inquiry should not be governed by whether the judge's sentence 
ultimately exceeded the maximum statutory sentence. 86 
79 Buckland, 277 F.3d at 1187. 
80 Id. at 1203. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 1181. 
83 Id. at 1201. 
84 Id. at 1195. 
85 Buckland, 277 F.3d at 1195. 
86 Id. 
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Thus, while the Ninth Circuit may have resolved one issue 
surrounding the constitutionality of 21 U.S.C. § 841 in light of 
Apprendi, it may actually have created more uncertainty 
regarding the application of the federal statute. 
Brian Michael Feinberg* 
* J.D. Candidate, Golden Gate University School of Law, May 2003. "Just to dig it all 
an' not to wonder." Van Morrison. 
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